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[I]t is perhaps the principal task of the political and moral theorist to enable rational 
agents to learn what they need to learn from the social and cultural tradition that 
they inherit, while becoming able to put in question that particular tradition’s 
distortions and errors and so, often enough, engaging in a quarrel with some 
dominant forms of their own political moral culture.1 
 
What would a course on ethics look like if it took into account Alasdair MacIntyre’s concerns 
about actually teaching students ethical practices? How could professors induct students into 
practices that prompt both reflection on their cultural formation and self-knowledge of the ways 
they have been formed by it? According to MacIntyre, such elements are prerequisites for an 
adequate moral education. His criticism of what he terms “Morality” includes the claim that most 
courses don’t even try to teach the right things. He charges that academic teaching has little if 
anything to do with character formation, whereas thick practices can transform lives in ways mere 
argument can never do.2 Even those of us who appreciate his arguments and agree with his 
criticisms, however, may find implementing more adequate forms of ethical instruction in the 
university classroom a tall order. 
My goal in this essay is to provide a sketch of my own experimental course on normative ethics 
in order to illustrate what teaching according to a more MacIntyrean program might look like. 
Following the lead of MacIntyre’s After Virtue trilogy and Charles Taylor’s Sources of the Self,3 
my course undertakes a review of ethical theories along narrative-historical lines, explicitly framed 
as a form of reflective self-awareness and dialogical identity-formation. The purpose of such a 
frame is to help students recognize, articulate, and assess the coherence and cogency of their own 
moral inheritances. At the same time, students engage in week-long formative practices, reflecting 
on their own character formation at the end of each. From a better grasp of their own situation, 
they are able to evaluate their own practical commitments and be more intentional about the habits 
and virtues they need going forward. 
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Because only so much can be accomplished in a single semester, the course gives students a 
healthy introduction to such a project, aiming to incentive its ongoing development. That is, I hope 
to give them an initial appreciation of the long-term payoff, while equipping them with the 
motivation and tools they would need to continue the project after the course was over. Moreover, 
because I teach the course at a Christian liberal arts university,4 I have additional theoretical and 
practical resources at my disposal. Namely, I can articulate substantive goods and a thick 
anthropology my students already assume, I can incorporate spiritual disciplines into the structure 
of the course, and I can point students to existing Christian churches as communities of practice 
that students could join. Nevertheless, as a philosopher, I am keen to approach even these matters 
through reflection and reasoned argument. 
In Ethics and the Conflicts of Modernity, MacIntyre stresses that moral education requires that 
students learn “the disciplines of reflective practice.”5 My course is built on that theme, following 
ideas I had experimented with previously.6 So, on the first day of class, we begin with a reflection 
on the state of moral theory and how it informs the standard way of teaching ethics, which I call 
the “Moral Cafeteria” approach. When adopting this approach, textbooks on moral theory typically 
outline three to five moral theories and then apply them to various case studies, moral dilemmas, 
or controversial social issues. Such approaches present normative ethics as a body of theoretical 
knowledge and technical expertise that anyone can apply, regardless of their moral character or 
stage of moral development.7 In the standard approach’s theory-application model, students learn 
each theory and attempt to apply it to case studies or moral dilemmas. However, the textbooks 
then leave them to choose, without any overarching criteria, between the array of theories, and to 
justify their choices in terms of the theory that best captures their pre-reflective intuitions about 
how hard cases should be handled. Where those intuitions came from and how they are formed is 
left unaddressed and unquestioned. If different theories justify different outcomes in various cases, 
students tend to adopt a cafeteria-like approach to the theories, tending toward whatever theoretical 
justification suits their needs to solve a given moral problem. 
My criticism of this approach includes the following MacIntyrean objections: (a) it makes the 
basis of morality seem arbitrary, or reliant on individual preference (or current social consensus); 
(b) there do not seem to be any rational criteria on offer to adjudicate between theories; and (c) it 
is not clear to students why or how they should evaluate moral theories rationally other than by 
appeal to, say, the standard of internal consistency (and they aren’t sure why internal consistency 
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should trump their own consciences or their sometimes-conflicting moral intuitions about what is 
right). Furthermore, (d) why this particular set of theoretical options is the correct one or the only 
one on offer remains mysterious, since the standard approach presents them as an ahistorical array 
of alternatives. Both MacIntyre and Taylor contend that, without any historical background, we 
are at a loss to explain which systems seem appealing, what counts as an ethical problem, and 
which moral concepts might be used to frame a situation (adequately or inadequately). Our answers 
to these questions depend on where we stand in the narrative of human history and culture. As a 
last point of objection, (e) moral judgment and choice cannot be captured in or taught as technique 
to be applied by just anyone (e.g., just any college undergraduate), regardless of moral character 
or experience. It matters whether people are experts in practical wisdom, or undeveloped 
apprentices with immature desires, or people whose eyes have been steadily corrupted by vice. 
The standard approach therefore frequently breeds cynicism, heightens students’ already highly 
subjective approach to moral questions, and makes them despair of having any good reason to be 
moral, even if they assume they can “master” a moral system’s technical demands. Importantly, 
the standard approach also neglects altogether several important moral features of the lives of 
MacIntyre’s “plain persons,” a category that includes my students. For example, missing topics 
include what role friendship and common projects might play in a good life,8 and how moral 
development happens over time (vs. a present-moment “snapshot” conception of moral choices). 
Further, this approach fails to reflect that most of our moral lives centers not on crisis situations or 
intractable dilemmas, but rather everyday routines and the implicit formation that comes from 
participating in certain types of communities or institutions. Finally, it is notable that ethics 
textbooks fail to mention how the ethical life relates to religious commitments and the formative 
influence of religious communities. 
I introduce our course as an intentional contrast to the standard approach. Thus we examine our 
own moral situation and identity as the result of a long history of inheritances (some of which 
content is now highly de-contextualized). This means taking a historical approach to our current 
predicament and fragmented moral identity, following the example of MacIntyre’s After Virtue 
and Charles Taylor’s Sources of the Self. In a parallel way, we assume that our moral lives are 
themselves an unfolding narrative of formative practices and reflective evaluation in which 
character develops within a community over time. We assume, too, that we inhabit a metaphysical 
stance toward goodness and truth that not only enables us to evaluate the deficiencies of modern 
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moral theories (and their common assumptions about morality), but shows how a religious ethical 
tradition has the resources to rationally assess the strengths and weaknesses of its rivals, while 
acknowledging its own status as a self-critical community of practitioners. This is possible in large 
part because as a tradition—in MacIntyre’s sense—its lived articulation of the human good is 
carried on cross-culturally and over a long history, it depends on transcendent standards, and it 
includes as its main goal personal transformation and apprenticeship into a certain kind of 
communal life. Because most of the students identify as members of this tradition already, they 
have some of the moral training and experience needed to see where theorizing makes sense of (or 
fails to make sense of) the shared practices of their families, churches, and communities.9 
MacIntyre insists that students—as practical reasoners and moral agents—will need self-
awareness and self-knowledge to reflect and learn from past mistakes as mistakes, especially since 
we often recognize these only retrospectively. This point inspires our first class exercise. Students 
are given twenty to thirty minutes to work on a “memento mori” exercise.10 In this assignment, 
they imagine and then write out the eulogy that might be given at their funeral by an honest friend 
or family member. Funerals are one of the few places in contemporary life where people focus on 
personal character, assessed from a whole-life perspective. (This in contrast to retirement or 
graduation parties, where successful performances or achievements are the main focus.) The 
assignment prompts students to ask and answer two questions: Who have I become so far in my 
life?—an assessment of current character—and, Who might I wish to become if I had more 
time?—an articulation of aspirational character. 
Many of the students find themselves unaccustomed to reflection on their lives as a whole, 
unfamiliar with character assessment in general, and inarticulate about virtue terms and concepts 
with which someone might capture a person’s character. The exercise implicitly raises questions 
about the difference between personality traits and virtues of character, how students’ current 
character might have been formed, who might have most influenced their formation, and what 
sorts of traits or virtues are worth cultivating going forward. In the discussion after the exercise, I 
make these points explicit via conversation prompts: 
 
1. How does this exercise focus on different things from a graduation ceremony? 
2. How has the family you are a part of, or the school or church community you are a part 
of, or the culture around you, shaped the character you observe in yourself? 
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3. What makes a trait a virtue vs. a characteristic part of your personality (such as being 
sarcastic, or optimistic, or being organized, or a leader)? 
 
The exercise raises questions of virtue and character to prompt students to recognize for 
themselves that these sorts of “big picture” questions are both curiously missing from most moral 
discourse and theorizing and nonetheless implicitly assumed in their own daily practice. Through 
the assignment, they become aware that they have already given—in fact, are already living out—
an answer to the question about what is a worthwhile way to live as a human being. Their own 
choices have accumulated into character traits that likely reflect some ordering of goods. As 
MacIntyre remarks, “Reflective agents thus increasingly understand themselves and others in 
terms of a certain kind of narrative, a story in which they as agents direct themselves or fail to 
direct themselves toward a final end, the nature of which they initially apprehend in and through 
their activities as rational agents.”11 He goes on to say this means that 
 
the initial task of theoretical enquiry is to articulate and develop further what is 
implicit in or presupposed by practice. And it needs to be stressed once again that 
agents engaged in such theoretical reflection continue to need to learn from each 
other, albeit not primarily as fellow students of theory, but as fellow agents engaged 
in achieving common goods in the practice and productive activities of everyday 
life, so that their moral and political education needs to be very different from that 
of the academic theorist.12 
 
This college ethics course gives them, like Aristotle’s students in the Nichomachean Ethics, a 
chance to reflect on their formation so far. After appropriate self-study, they can either endorse 
what they have become and carry that project forward, or they can embark on further 
transformation in a revised direction—assuming there are practicing communities to which they 
can appropriately apprentice themselves.  
The next section of the course is therefore offered as a response to the existential questions of 
plain persons: e.g. What sort of person am I becoming? Is that a good kind of human being to 
become? What sort of life am I already living, and what goods does it prioritize? What sorts of 
character traits does it encourage and reward? Is that kind of life in fact a good human life? What 
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reasons might I give for this picture of the good life being adequate? Why do I find obvious the 
answers that I give to those questions (or that my culture or community gives)? What sorts of 
reasons do I have that might not be accessible outside my way of life? What alternatives have I 
not considered? Do my answers seem coherent and correct? 
In part one of the course, we begin with primary sources in eudaimonist (virtue) ethics. First, 
we read sections of Plato’s Republic that portray philosophy (i.e., striving after the common goods 
of wisdom and virtue) as a rival way of life to pleonexia (i.e., acquisitiveness regarding competitive 
goods). Each life has a contrasting ordering of goods and incompatible programs of desire and 
habit formation. We also study Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, focusing on the training of 
appetite required for proper self-love, the inter-relationship of virtues of character and practical 
wisdom, and the friendship books. Secondary sources, such as chapters on ancient philosophy and 
Christianity as “spiritual exercises” in Pierre Hadot’s Philosophy as a Way of Life,13 chapters on 
“the need to learn and the drive to aspire” in Julia Annas’s Intelligent Virtue, and Myles Burnyeat’s 
paper “Aristotle on Learning to be Good” on the stages of moral education,14 are also 
recommended supplementary readings on the syllabus at this point. Further, we consider three 
examples of “cultural translation” of Aristotle in later historical periods,15 all from the Christian 
tradition. First, Jane Austen’s novel, Pride and Prejudice, offers a narrative portrayal of the three 
marriages that exemplify Aristotle’s three types of friendships based on pleasure, utility, and 
virtue.16 Then we consider what intellectual virtue looks like in Augustine (i.e., the well-ordered 
desire for knowledge vs. curiositas, its prideful and possessive opposite17), and how courage is 
reshaped by the theological virtues of faith, hope, and love in Aquinas. Exemplars of virtue shift 
accordingly: both the citizen-soldier advancing the civic good despite painful obstacles and the 
martyr who endures persecution, holding fast to the eternal good, meet the Aristotelian definition 
of courage, even if the latter does so in ways that Aristotle would not have recognized.18 Such 
examples show how later thinkers both appropriated and adapted this ancient tradition in new 
social, historical, and religious contexts. Moreover, we note ways in which later thinkers worked 
from vantage points that enabled criticism and correction of earlier versions of a virtuous life. For 
example, Augustinian humility pushes in one way against Platonic hubris, and in another way 
against modern humanism. 
While we study appropriations of Aristotle, we engage in a week-long practice exercise, 
documenting our own daily efforts to practice the virtue of temperance. The instructions prompt 
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the students to contrast temperance (the virtue) with mere self-control. Students also follow 
instructions to heed Aristotle’s advice about hitting the mean of virtue in Nicomachean Ethics 2.9 
by compensating for both human nature (most notably, tendencies toward excess pleasure-seeking) 
and their own personal proclivities. At the end of a week, they have to submit their journal (a daily 
log and brief reflection). Then they answer open-ended follow-up questions together in classroom 
discussion groups. In other words, students practice the type of Aristotelian virtue cultivation they 
read about, while reflecting individually and corporately on a specific practice that comprises part 
of an Aristotelian virtue cultivation program. From previous experience, many of the students 
“knew” that they tended to eat poorly when tired, but the week-long exercise seemed to illuminate 
and internalize this point: they came away from the week planning ways to mitigate this situation 
and its attendant temptations. That meant that reshaping their desires for food meant reshaping 
much more of their lives: eating at more regular times, sharing meals with others/eating 
communally, cooking food they had purchased themselves, getting more regular sleep, and so on. 
MacIntyre highlights “the importance of such habits and their relationship to those institutionalized 
routines that structure our everyday lives.”19 Ideally, such reflection leads both to new personal 
habits and different communal routines and ways of life. 
A second practice exercise focuses on the intellectual virtues and the formation of the mind and 
imagination. Iris Murdoch makes the point in “Vision and Choice in Morality” that, by the moment 
any specific moral decision-making happens, most of the moral work has already been done.20 
Which goods one has in view (in light of a life well lived), the motivations and emotions that vision 
cultivates and cues up, which situations present themselves as imaginatively possible or as 
requiring a response from us, all frame the content and character of decisions of the moment—
indeed, they have often already sorted whether an explicit decision needs to be made at all. Moral 
philosophy must begin, therefore, by cultivating the moral imagination, by presenting the good, 
the true, and the beautiful as cornerstones of our characteristic motivational structure and as 
attractive and inspiring ends to be desired. No moral theory is complete without a “vision of the 
good,” says Murdoch. A principle-application model is therefore only a truncated formal system 
of decision-making technique. It either lacks such a vision, or (as in MacIntyre’s depiction of the 
market) depends on one that is implicit. What possibilities and goods we envision, picture through 
role models or narratives, and articulate with thick moral concepts deeply form our character and 
the concrete choices that follow from it. For my students, the worlds of possible human experience 
41  DeYoung 
 
 
they have imaginatively inhabited and the goods they therefore long for are already set by the films 
they have watched, the advertisements they think they have become inured to, and the images of 
a successful life their communities have championed (or omitted). Any “mere” decision-making 
technique will work from and within these ideals, rather than challenging them or reflectively 
examining their value. Inmates I also teach could not envision, or even imagine, at age eighteen or 
nineteen, when they committed their crimes, that there was a way of life that included lifelong 
religious commitments, sacrifice of their immediate desires, or educational endeavors that they 
could find worthwhile and pursue successfully, nor did they have pictures of fatherhood that 
involved mentoring, attention, prayer, patience, and so on. Moreover, such visions are best 
“caught” and not merely theoretically “taught.” Ancient ethics took these visions of the good 
seriously as the groundwork from which the moral life begins, and it did not confine them to ethics 
classrooms. This is why Plato cares so deeply about poetry and music, and why Aristotle thinks 
pleasure- and emotion-training is essential to character development: we have to learn to long for 
and delight in the right sorts of goods in order to have practical reason’s “good eye” in the moment 
of deliberation. 
The next practice exercise engages Augustine on intellectual virtue. In his view, the well-
ordered pursuit of knowledge as a gift involves humble and delighted participation in God’s 
knowledge, a paradigm that contrasts with human mastery of instrumentally valuable but otherwise 
inert subject matter. Along with the readings, students spend a week memorizing 1 Corinthians 13 
(on love as the “most excellent way” of life). They are given the option of reading the whole 
chapter slowly and then memorizing only verses 4–8a, or memorizing the whole chapter. The 
exercise is called “Contemplation as an Act of Love.” Its purpose is to dwell on the same ideas 
and the same text by repeating them slowly, memorizing and internalizing what we read, and 
meditating on or contemplating key phrases. Most of the reading students do is on screens, in skim-
and-scroll, rapid information-gathering mode. Contemplative reading is a counter-cultural, re-
formational practice designed to slow them down and get them to sit with a text, returning to it 
multiple times to see if different insights emerge from multiple readings. The practice is a way of 
apprenticing oneself to the wisdom of the text, in a mode of receptivity to unfolding revelation, 
rather than a mode of mastery, possession, and disposable use. Much of the content of the passage, 
moreover, concerns the relationship between knowledge and love (e.g., knowledge without love is 
empty and vain; knowledge is partial in this life; love brings knowledge to perfection “face to 
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face”). So the act of contemplating a text on love, as itself an act of love, holds together the practice 
and reflection on it. In this section of the course, we therefore try to understand and live into ways 
that key figures in the Christian tradition translated the ancient eudaimonist/virtue paradigm into 
its own idiom and framework, theoretically and practically. 
We devote an entire class period to discussing in small groups what the practice exercises 
illuminated about our habits and implicit view of the good. The exercises are designed to develop 
self-knowledge and to raise awareness of how our own formation had been culturally (or 
“sociologically”) influenced, for better or worse. Students often discover, as MacIntyre predicts, 
that “the transformation of ourselves that is involved is significantly different from what we had 
expected.”21 Many students take the occasion to comment on how the exercise changed their view 
of themselves or made them consider more intentionally what goods were worth pursuing. Like 
my incarcerated students, many often conclude that such goods are currently unattainable, since 
they require maturity that only comes with more practice. The exercise serves as an occasion to 
self-identify as apprentices in a larger moral community of more seasoned practitioners. This takes 
humility and trust, since “some of our important ends are such that it would be a mistake to think 
of them as adequately specifiable by us in advance of and independently of our involvement in 
those activities through which we try to realize them.”22 Furthermore, to achieve certain ends, we 
at the same time need to become the right sort of person. 
Lastly, David Solomon’s “Internal Objections to Virtue Ethics” raises objections to the 
virtue/eudaimonist approach to ethics.23 This essay also includes one “external” criticism of virtue 
ethics, or at least to an Aristotelian (or Platonic) version of it. The objection is that such a moral 
program requires adherence to a substantive and teleological conception of human nature and the 
human good. But, Solomon notes, ancient conceptions have been roundly rejected, and attempts 
to find substitutes have ended in hopeless controversy—either metaphysical, theological, or both. 
MacIntyre sets out the alternatives as “Nietzsche or Aristotle?” precisely because such debates 
have typically ended in the conclusion that, because no natures and no objective truth about goods 
exist, everyone should be left to follow her own preferred “revaluation of values.”24 Virtue ethics’ 
choice of virtues and human goodness seems to require one to inhabit a thick tradition, and one 
often equally at odds with contemporary ways of life and their theoretical assumptions about 
morality. 
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In the next two sections of the course, we track the major ethical theories of the modern period, 
Kantian deontology and variants of consequentialism in Hume, Bentham, and Mill. In keeping 
with our narrative approach to these ethical developments, we consider each alternative not as an 
abstract slate of theories, but via primary texts situated in their respective historical and 
sociological contexts. Each theory was developed in response to a particular historical moment 
and rival ideas. So, for example, Kant’s construction of formal systems reacts to post-Reformation 
intractable religious conflict and the inadequacies of resting universal moral norms on 
Humean/human material contingencies, such as feelings of sympathy, desires for social approval, 
and considerations of utility. Both Kant and Mill think they can capture the vast part of the content 
of what was previously a Christian ethic, while rejecting its (and Aristotle’s) metaphysical 
baggage. Again, reading assignments canvas contemporary appropriations, in part to appreciate 
that functionally we (that is, contemporary North Americans) have already incorporated this 
approach, its characteristic reasoning, and its conclusions into certain parts of our own identities 
and spheres of contemporary life. For example, debates about abortion and gun ownership are 
carried out almost exclusively in terms of rights talk, which is grounded in the inviolable dignity 
and autonomy of each human being and likewise in the sovereignty of rational persons’ free choice 
of the will. Likewise, implicitly and operationally we tend to identify ourselves as individual 
choosers, autonomous agents, and bearers of rights. This is evident, for example, in the ways we 
experience angry entitlement (behind the wheel, in the political arena), shopping and consumer 
habits that revolve around individual choice, and our attitudes toward personal relationships as 
contracts of consent. Students read both Thomas Hill’s essay on self-respect as a Kantian duty 
(treating Hill as a contemporary appropriator of Kantian deontology) and Robin Dillon’s essay (as 
a critic) on how self-respect duly cultivated depends on a unduly masculinist view of a respect-
worthy moral self.25 Dillon’s essay points out the implicit cultural picture of idealized human 
nature behind the moral obligations set forth. At the end of her article, Dillon comments that human 
beings learn to respect themselves by being respected by others in a community—an insight that 
hints at more Aristotelian approaches to moral development. We note the ways that key aspects of 
eudaimonist ethics (virtues and character development over time, friendship and community) seem 
absent without a second thought in a deontological system. 
Our moral inheritances and sense of self are further shaped by consequentialist 
conceptualizations of the moral life. From their initial home in social reform movements of the 
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1800s, utilitarian attempts to increase and maximize human welfare were increasingly 
bureaucratized. Especially when dealing with social systems (e.g., health care) and economic 
distribution over large-scale populations, we now tend to default into consequentialist-style 
reasoning. It feels natural to us to think that we should weigh or sum overall outcomes when 
debating what policies to implement. Peter Singer’s “Famine, Affluence, and Morality” is a 
signature piece of such reasoning.26 Students usually find it intuitively appealing prior to reflection. 
Human welfare is the focus of moral obligation, and costs and benefits must be weighed in a world 
of scarce resources to maximize overall outcomes. Strikingly, Singer’s essay is also representative 
of consequentialists’ gravitation toward consideration of physical needs, in part because these are 
observable and quantifiable measures of well-being (by contrast, consider MacIntyre’s 
commentary on the World Happiness Database),27 but also because decision-making is thereby 
done from an ostensibly value-neutral, naturalistic perspective using only instrumental reasoning. 
From such a (limited) perspective, physical well-being might be one of the few things we can agree 
are part of the human good. Singer’s piece also provides a textbook case of the tyranny of the 
moral over all other concerns and MacIntyre’s own description of “Morality,” which names a 
specialized sphere of obligation that trumps other concerns and overrides all other goods. Despite 
the criticism lodged against the consequentialist point of view (we also read Bernard Williams on 
the virtue of integrity—a virtue unintelligible to utilitarian reasoners), part of the point of this 
section of the course, like the other two, is to recognize that utilitarian intuitions and patterns of 
thinking are in fact already partially formative of our own default moral identities. 
To prompt critical reflection on utilitarian approaches to the distribution of goods, we practice 
a week of gratitude. The exercise is framed by Robert C. Roberts’ chapter on gratitude in Spiritual 
Emotions.28 The exercise is designed not only to have students practice expressing gratitude for 
the good things in their lives, but also to give them eyes to see the world in terms of gifts and 
goodness they have been (gratuitously) given. The religious perspective Roberts articulates shows 
students the difference between a stance of entitlement amid scarce resources and a stance of 
grateful receptivity, and the ways in which detachment and attachment to contingent and 
ephemeral worldly goods are radically reconceived from a Christian point of view. In that view, 
the ultimate and unconditionally given gift of a love relationship to the Giver remains the point of 
central concern, not the accumulation of good things or contingent blessings in this life.29 Further, 
as in Griffiths’ work on a rightly-ordered desire for knowledge, the primary stance of the recipient 
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should be wise stewardship of whatever gifts she has in service of the common good. Unlike the 
model of privately isolated or exclusive ownership, goods are meant to benefit the whole 
community. Not surprisingly, this frame might well lead to similar conclusions as Singer’s (i.e., 
practices of radical giving), but in very different ways, with very different motives. The take-away 
from the gratitude exercise is that not all practices that appear to be externally similar are the same 
activities with the same formative effect on desire or the same good as their telos. Again, we are 
trying to capture Aristotelian insights: virtue habituation must transcend mere imitation, must be 
modeled by the practically wise who have a good eye both for ends and means because of their 
rightly trained emotional attachments and aversions, and must include knowledge of both what 
one is doing and why. 
At this point in the course, I sketch out key features of each view, the places in our lives when 
each moral modus operandi seems natural to us (individually and as political communities) to 
default to, and the incompatibilities between them. This summation captures the “sociological self-
knowledge” that MacIntyre commends.30 Students have now come to see their own identity as a 
conglomeration of practices and points of views that don’t all cohere and sometimes compete with 
each other. But they have also been shown that this identity—however fragmented31—feeds and 
forms their practice. It shapes the character and value of their lives as human beings. If this needs 
to become more explicit, a reprise of the eulogy exercise can be helpful. The existential 
predicament for students is now two-fold: first, how can I make my own identity and character 
coherent, instead of fragmented, and second, around which sort of picture of the human good can 
I build such a life (with adequate justification)? 
Returning to Solomon’s external objection, I raise the concern that we can’t resolve disputes 
without digging down to metaphysical commitments, but I also suggest a MacIntyrean way to go 
forward rationally in the face of incompatible options. We read MacIntyre’s paper 
“Epistemological Crises”32 to explore the thesis that often the only rational way to make such 
evaluative judgments is to live inside a tradition and see which problems it can solve, which 
pseudo-problems from other views it can successfully resolve or reconfigure, and which lacunas 
and insoluble puzzles of its own remain. In addition, I stress, in light of the practice exercises, that 
every way forward requires both intellectual and practical commitments. Given the dialogical 
character of identity formation and all the implicit formation that shapes our moral character, we 
can’t live out any option without practice and a thick community of practitioners. 
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The last section of the course revisits the virtue/eudaimonist tradition, but this time from a 
Christian perspective—a historical tradition embodied in thick communities of distinctive liturgies 
and practices. We read essays on Christian virtues and chapters on vices, including pieces on the 
vice of vainglory and “liturgical sincerity” (i.e., sincerity as a virtue desired in worship practices),33 
viewed through this historical and communal lens and undergirded by a picture of human nature 
and the human good. At the same time, we engage in one last practice exercise, which is the 
culmination of a daily practice we’ve done together all semester. From the first day of the course, 
we spend the first three minutes of class time in silence together. I do not guide this practice much, 
but only instruct students to breathe deeply and be still. If nothing else, I tell them, this will give 
them practice in pausing before a task to calmly center their attention and intentionally ready 
themselves for it; ideally, it will be an exercise in living against the culture of busy achievement 
and the deluge of information that they inhabit the rest of the day. (As one student put it, “I realized 
that it was the only time of day that I ever stopped doing something.”) We sit together, awkwardly 
at first, in total silence—without music, a news feed, phone alerts, or conversation. As the semester 
wears on, the students begin to appreciate and look forward to that time. But during the reading on 
the vice of vainglory, we try the ancient Christian practice of silence for a full week. The 
instructions give students the option to try a modified form of it—a week of silencing self-talk—
to make it possible to live on a college campus and still do the assignment with integrity. In one 
form or the other, this week is a more intensive version of what we’d been practicing all semester. 
The insights that come in a week of intentional individual practice are typically different from 
those that come from intentionally guided communal practice over several months’ time. 
The upshot of the course is, with MacIntyre and Nietzsche, to reject modern “Morality,” or at 
least put it into serious question, especially in the fragmented, incoherent version of it without 
adequate foundations that we have inherited and currently practice. But rather than leave students 
at sea looking for an adequate alternative, we end the course with the theoretical and practical 
resources of Christian theology, inviting students to explore its resources. Can this appropriation 
and translation of the Thomist-Aristotelian tradition give us metaphysical foundations, in the form 
of a satisfying view of human nature and the human good (as social beings created for a fellowship 
of love with God and each other)? Can its view of human nature offer reasons why pleonexic 
expressivist individualism and Nietzchean self-creation will not ultimately satisfy us? Can it 
provide—in the form of the local and global church—an arena for embodying virtue practices and 
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carrying on the tradition (in intergenerational ways that can be adapted across cultures and eras of 
history)? And, most important, can students envision themselves as its apprentices (now) and its 
future role models and articulators (later), formed by its signature virtues (faith, hope, and love) 
and striving to better understand how to live them well? 
There are obvious limits to what anyone could accomplish in a liberal arts classroom in a single 
semester. I take MacIntyre’s point that academic instruction cannot substitute for life-long 
character formation even in the best of settings. In the worst, it remains “irrelevant.” My goal with 
the course is to move our study of normative ethics—in terms of the way people live their ordinary 
lives and engage in daily formative practices—closer to being relevant to moral formation. You 
might think of the course as a lived experiment into the limits of the potential of the contemporary 
college classroom experience. A classroom community is comparatively thin; it is also constrained 
and motivated by powerful external goods—grades, financial aid, scholarships, and student debt, 
institutional rubrics of success that measure only quantitative results, and other demands on 
students’ time—that press hard on students’ ability to invest in learning for the sake of lifelong 
character formation and a well-lived human life. Such goods, as MacIntyre rightly points out in 
“The Irrelevance of Ethics,” do not weigh heavily on the scales of short-term gains and are hard 
to capture in learning outcomes. To compensate, the end of the course does not leave students on 
their own, but instead points them toward thick communities of practice already in place. Such 
communities, already committed to robust common goods and dedicated to the cultivation of 
virtue, can plausibly provide opportunities and occasions for the long-term training needed to 
develop students’ character more fully. 
In the meantime, the fact that the students and I have been training (with successes and failures) 
and reflecting regularly on our training together provides a sort of communal bonding experience. 
Many students cite adjusting past the awkwardness of practicing silence together as a challenging 
but trust-building moment. The class exercises are meant to give them an insider’s view of the 
power of such disciplines to transform their lives and the benefits of submitting to them. Reflection 
on the practices (in small groups, after each week-long exercise, guided by readings and discussion 
prompts) points students to how dramatically counter-cultural and intentionally carried out their 
formation will have to be in some cases. If my experiment to craft a more MacIntyrean model of 
ethical instruction is ultimately successful, it incentivizes that project and points students to places 
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where they can continue it—well beyond the walls of the classroom and the time frame of the 
semester—to make character formation in virtue a way of life. 
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